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Abstract 
We focus on the impact of individual habits of people on information security. More specifically, we 
ascertain the difference between conscious and unconscious errors in security breaches. Over the years, 
buzz words such as neuro-IS have come up, yet none have identified in a succinct manner, how issues 
pertaining to the human brain can be addressed. 
Introduction 
Samantha needed to work on a large file at home. It was too big to email, so she absent-mindedly 
plugged a flash drive someone had left in the break room into her desktop’s USB port. This was not an 
issue for her since she had used the flash drive plenty of times in the past. She had logged on with her 
password, and the company’s email client was open. This simple act started a chain reaction, launching 
malware hidden on the flash drive that propagated by attaching a copy of the malignant code to every 
email she sent. Within hours, the corporate network was thoroughly compromised. 
This hypothetical vignette illustrates an important insight that eludes many IS managers tasked with 
information security (InfoSec) — many breaches occur when users are not consciously aware of what they 
are doing. Unconscious behavior can defeat the best efforts of security experts, meaning all of the security 
protocols in the world are powerless in the face of a stressed out worker. According to Microsoft’s Security 
Intelligence report, 44.8% of vulnerabilities result from user action such as clicking a link, or being tricked 
into installing malware (Microsoft, 2011). The expense of breaches continues to escalate, with costs per 
incident totaling more than $7 million plus damaged reputations and loss of customer trust. Because of 
this, it is not a surprise that information security has attracted increased corporate attention. Security 
breach incidents not only cause a loss of customer goodwill and trust; but also have serious regulatory 
implications. Lewis (Lewis, 2003) concluded that human error accounted for over 65% of data breach 
incidents resulting in economic loss. Schultz (Schultz, 2005) referred to information security as being 
primarily a people problem – since technology is designed and managed by people, leaving opportunities 
for human error. Otto et al. (Otto, Antón, & Baumer, 2007) stated that an important measure put in place 
by Choice Point after a breach was aimed at addressing the problem of high error rates in customer 
records. Yet, even with numerous technical (firewalls, anti-virus, anti-spyware etc.) and non-technical 
(security education, training, and awareness) measures, the rate at which security breaches occur due to 
human error continue to trend upward. Our purpose is to identify a potential reason for this that has been 
largely overlooked in the literature. Based on our research, which we highlight in the next section, we 
contend that the answer lies in addressing the difference between conscious and unconscious errors in 
security breaches. This issue needs to be developed for any meaningful modeling. Unconscious habits 
form the center of human behavior, yet are largely underestimated and misunderstood. We adapt the 
Martin-Morich (Martin & Morich, 2011) model of behavior to information security.  
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Literature Review 
Because users interact with information systems on a regular basis in their business activities, how they 
use the systems and whether they follow established measures will ultimately determine the overall 
security of an organization’s information systems. Fundamentally, traditional IS security has a 
“behavioral root” (Workman & Gathegi, 2007) and is a subject of psychological and sociological actions of 
people. Most prior research in organizational IS security has dealt with success and failure of security 
policies. General Deterrence Theory (GDT) has been used to investigate the effect of organizational 
deterrent measures on computer abuses by employees. Deterrent measures can reduce computer abuse by 
potential offenders if the risk of punishment is high (deterrent certainty) and penalties for violations are 
severe (deterrent severity) (Straub 1990). However, findings regarding the effectiveness of deterrence 
measures have been mixed. Deterrent and preventive methods have a positive impact on information 
security effectiveness, but severity of the deterrence method does not (Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 
2003).  Contrary to what is proposed by GDT, organizations with a high number of deterrent measures 
have higher incidents of insider abuse (Lee, Lee , & Yoo, 2004), indicating a significant negative relation 
between deterrent measures and insider abuse.  
Prior studies have also focused on employee compliance to security policies. An Information Security 
Policy Compliance Model suggests that a user’s intention to comply with security policies is influenced by 
user attitude toward complying.  According to the authors, user attitudes and intentions are influenced by 
a mixture of negative and positive reinforcements (Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007) Examples of 
negative reinforcements according to Pahnila et al. (Pahnila, et al., 2007) include sanctions, threat 
appraisal, coping appraisal, and normative beliefs and positive reinforcements include information 
quality of policies, facilitation conditions, and habits.  
In a similar study, the antecedents of employee compliance with information security policy (ISP) of an 
organization were investigated (Sneha & Varshney, 2009).  The study indicated that an employee’s 
attitude positively influences an employee’s intention to comply with the ISP. In addition, information 
security awareness significantly influenced an employee’s attitude to comply with the ISP through the 
employee’s beliefs.  
There are a number of problems with the authors’ approach to modeling IS that conflict with behavioral 
psychology that we will briefly address before introducing the Martin-Morich model. Pahnila et al. make a 
semantic error, confusing negative reinforcement with punishment. Reinforcement is any feedback that 
occurs after a behavior that makes that behavior more likely to occur in the future (Baker, Piper, 
McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004). A negative reinforcement is the removal of an aversive that occurs 
after a behavior, such as the silencing of an alarm clock by hitting a button. Positive reinforcement is a 
reward that occurs after a behavior. Punishment is any feedback that occurs after a behavior that makes 
the behavior less likely to occur. Positive punishment adds an aversive, while negative punishment takes 
away something that is perceived positively, such as taking away a favorite toy in response to a child’s 
complaining.  
In the authors’ conceptualization, behavior can be made habitual “through making it mandatory initially 
or introducing rewards and other incentives.” Feedback mechanisms facilitate habit formation by 
communicating to the unconscious mind a relationship between a behavior and a consequence. Incentives 
are offered before a behavior, and therefore do not directly influence habit formation.   
Another structural problem of the model is the linkage between attitude, intention, and behavior. The 
literature suggests that attitude and intention only weakly predict behavior. One large meta-analysis 
showed that the correlation between attitude and behavior is less than 0.3. The linkage between intention 
and behavior is less than 0.5.  
Pahnila et al. include habit in their model, but misapply the concept within their hypothesis.  
H7. Habits affect an employee’s intention to comply with IS security policies.  
As a ‘habit is unconscious or automatic behavior, as opposed to intentions or conscious behavior,’ 
according to the authors, a habit by definition cannot affect an employee’s intention to comply.  
 It is our contention that unconscious, habitual behavior is responsible for a large portion of 
InfoSec errors in ways that ultimately bypass most security policies, processes and procedures. In the next 
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section, we present a model based on our improved understanding of the roles of conscious and 
unconscious  in terms of behavior that relates to InfoSec.   
Model 
Compelling research from diverse fields including neuroscience, cognitive, social and behavioral 
psychology, and behavioral economics, reveals that most human behavior is predominantly the result of 
unconscious mental processes. When a person is in a familiar situation doing repetitive tasks, behavior 
rapidly becomes automatic, not open to conscious control. This research challenges the conventional 
wisdom embedded in most models of human behavior that posit humans are rational agents making 
conscious decisions.  
The impact of these research streams to InfoSec is profound. At the core of all security assumptions is that 
users are capable of following directions that require conscious attention to behaviors performed in highly 
habitual settings. From this perspective, it seems logical to assume that explaining the policies to users 
should be sufficient to obtain compliance. Yet, we will argue that a high percentage of security breaches 
are caused by unconscious user behavior, which is immune to all appeals that rely on conscious mind 
attention and control. We propose adapting the Martin-Morich model of consumer behavior (shown in 
Figure 1) to develop an improved approach to information security.  
 
Figure 1: Martin- Morich Model of Consumer Behavior 
The Determinants of Habitual Behavior 
Habits are automatic behaviors that are activated by cues in a stable context independent of goals and 
intentions. They are prepotent, quick to activate, do not require conscious intervention, and are persistent 
(Wood & Neal, 2009). The Model posits a dynamic process where the conscious and unconscious minds 
both participate in guiding decisions and behavior. Decisions and behaviors that are made repeatedly in 
stable contexts become increasingly habitual. Decisions and behaviors that are novel or occur in situations 
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that are not familiar are more heavily influenced by the conscious mind. The model is designed to more 
closely reflect real world experiences where habitual behaviors can be disrupted by something that gets 
the attention of the conscious mind, and even highly complex behaviors can become habitual with 
sufficient repetitions.  
Because the model describes a dynamic process, there is not a clear beginning or end. Behaviors under 
analysis might be new or ongoing for years. The model is designed to describe the process by which 
behavior becomes habitual over time and how it is possible to disrupt established habits.    
We will explicate the model from the top down for convenience.  
Level of Habit Formation  
Behavior is the culmination of a complex interplay between conscious and unconscious mental processes. 
The model places behavior along a continuum of habit formation, with fully conscious behavior (Pilot 
mode) on one end, and completely automatic behavior (Autopilot mode) on the other. Between these 
extremes are heuristics (Co-pilot mode) where simple rules govern behavior in familiar situations with 
multiple plausible behavioral responses. Contrary to human perception, most behavior is generated from 
the autopilot side of the spectrum.  
It is important to understand the intensity of the habitual behavior under study to comprehend the risk 
profile for violating InfoSec policy and procedures. Behavior that leads to high levels of habituation will 
inadvertently create greater security risks. 
Pilot Mode 
Pilot mode describes behaviors that are entirely or largely under the influence of the conscious mind. Pilot 
mode is engaged in novel situations where established behavioral repertoires do not exist and in 
situations that are highly important, highly salient, or highly risky.  
To engage in conscious thought requires effort, and the conscious mind fatigues rapidly. This is a primary 
flaw in most security assumptions. There is a pervasive naïve presumption that users will follow security 
practices if they understand them, and if punishments are in place if they do not. “The defining feature of 
System 2 (the conscious mind) is that its operations are effortful, and one of its main characteristics is 
laziness….”1 It is this laziness that causes the conscious mind to shift familiar tasks to the unconscious 
mind as quickly as possible. 
A good InfoSec example of this is passwords. Rules for passwords include not using the same password 
for multiple accounts and not using easy to remember passwords. In other words, passwords are designed 
to work against the way the brain works. Predictably, the most frequent calls to IT help lines (Forrester 
estimates between 25% and 40% of calls) is forgotten passwords (estimated by Gartner to cost $22 per 
call2).  
Co-pilot 
 
  Co-pilot mode describes behaviors that have been repeated in stable environments but introduce 
conditional changes. For example, at the grocery store a shopper might develop a heuristic to stock up 
when a particular item goes on sale.  Heuristics are quite common in working with information systems as 
users develop shortcuts based on varying responses from programs, devices and other users. Most users 
receive a large volume of emails every day and unconsciously develop heuristics about which emails are 
responded to. For example, an employee may reply to an email in an order that is dependent on who sent 
it. An urgent email from a supervisor may dictate first response, whereas messages from unidentifiable 
resources may be deleted. In this scenario, an attacker may assume that an employee has certain 
heuristics, and therefore may create a message that spoofs a supervisor. 
                                                             
1 Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking Fast and Slow; Farra, Straus and Giroux, New York  
2 “Automated Password Resets Cut IT Service Desk Costs. Gartner.  
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The conscious and unconscious minds work together to solve innumerable tasks throughout the day. 
Heuristics are simplified decision sets that can be described as the conscious mind intervening minimally 
to perform an action that is familiar. Heuristics also represent a threat to security because the conscious 
mind may not be sufficiently engaged to properly understand the security implications of a given 
behavior. For example, people in buildings that require badges to unlock doors might hold open the door 
for a woman, an elderly person, or someone with their hands full.  
Autopilot 
Autopilot mode represents behaviors that are repeated automatically without the need for conscious 
involvement. The transition from conscious to unconscious action can be seen in learning to type, where 
the conscious mind is at first heavily taxed, but quickly shifts learning of finger placement to the 
unconscious. The conscious mind thinks the word, the unconscious mind types. Once learned, the user’s 
typing speed is negatively impacted by the intrusion of the conscious mind, as when a user looks at the 
keyboard. 
Autopilot mode works outside of conscious awareness, and its workings are not available to conscious 
introspection. This means that a user may perform a behavior unknowingly that violates a policy that they 
understand and agree with. An example of this is Microsoft’s Vista operating system. In attempting to 
make Vista more secure, the designers forced users to click an “allow” button before tasks that might open 
up the computer to intrusion. But the ‘allow’ button was activated for numerous routine permissions, 
causing acceptance to become unconscious. This new habit defeats the purpose and effectiveness of this 
InfoSec solution.  
The unconscious mind works automatically and effortlessly; a user cannot turn it off. This means to a 
large degree even when someone is consciously interacting with an information system, there is still a 
significant amount of information being processed by the unconscious mind. Often what the user might 
describe as a Pilot decision is simply the conscious mind accepting a decision presented by the habitual 
mind. Moreover, because the conscious mind requires will and effort, it exhausts rapidly. Expecting users 
to remain consciously vigilant in highly contextualized environments is unrealistic. 
Context 
Habits form in stable contexts; situations that become familiar through unchanging repetition—like most 
workspaces. Established contexts signals the conscious brain that it does not have to pay attention; that 
routines that have worked before can be executed without conscious mind attention. Anyone who works 
in front of a computer screen for hours at a time, looking at the same programs, the same walls, sitting in 
the same chair for hours a day forms a uniquely powerful context. This is the central challenge to all 
efforts at information security; the very nature of working with PCs and programs puts people in highly 
habit-forming contexts. Considering that one of the greatest threats an organization faces is from insiders 
(Warkentin & Willison, 2009), employees in a highly contextualized environment may at times leave their 
workstations unattended to stroll around the office. However, if the computer is unlocked, it could 
provide an attacker with an opportunity to launch an attack.   
Cues 
Cues are stimuli that have become triggers of habitual behavior in contextualized situations. The human 
brain is inundated with millions of stimuli, the vast majority of which are not processed by the conscious 
mind. However, when a behavior becomes closely associated with a context, specific stimuli become cues 
that trigger that behavior, such as responding instantly to a text message. Cues are often built into 
information systems to create a desired behavior, such as a distinct sound to alert the user that a task 
needs to be performed. Once users become trained to automatically respond to a cue, they may respond to 
that cue inappropriately. 
Feedback 
Feedback is anything that occurs after a behavior has the potential to be viewed as a consequence of that 
behavior. Outcomes that increase the likelihood that a behavior will be repeated are termed reinforcing. 
 Information Security: Modeling the Unconscious Mind 
  
 Twenty-first Americas Conference on Information Systems, Puerto Rico, 2015 6 
Those that make a behavior less likely to occur are termed punishing. This is how the unconscious mind 
learns, by associating an act with a result. The closer in time between action and feedback, the more 
powerful the association3. Unconscious pairing of actions and feedback train the unconscious mind 
outside of conscious mind control. 
This important distinction, between educating the conscious mind and training the unconscious mind, 
must become imbedded in our approach to information and network security. It is not enough for users to 
know what they are supposed to do consciously; they must be trained sufficiently so that the unconscious 
mind operating on autopilot will do the right thing reliably. 
An example of this process is learning to use a computer mouse. The movement of the hand creates an 
immediate movement of the cursor. The unconscious brain rapidly adapts because the cause effect is exact 
and instantaneous. In an innovative experiment4, researchers programmed a mouse to move opposite of 
the way it was moved and then had subjects use the mouse while their hand and forearm were screened 
from view. After a few minutes of getting used to this arrangement, subjects perceived that their 
movements were in the same direction as the mouse, though they were actually moving in the opposite 
direction. 
The closer in time a feedback is to a behavior, the more powerful the feedback, be it reinforcing or 
punishing. The more intense the feedback, the more impactful it is to habit formation. The more 
consistent a feedback is to a behavior, the more it leads to habit formation. 
Strengthening Loop 
When a dynamic situation links a behavior, a cue, and reinforcing feedback, it leads to habit formation. 
The more repetitions, the more unconscious and automatic the behavior becomes. 
Disrupting Loop 
Disruptions cause the conscious mind to attend to a situation. Disruptions can occur at any point of the 
behavioral cycle. For example, a new context or sub-context might emerge that would tweak behaviors, 
such as a new backup system or accessing an application from a smartphone that had been accessed from 
a desktop or laptop. Cues and feedbacks can similarly change in ways that disrupt automatic responses 
and creates a conscious evaluation. Even behaviors that are highly habitual can be disrupted if there is a 
breakdown across the dynamic chain of events.  
Next Steps 
Our next step is to setup an experiment at an organization. Based on preliminary work and research, we 
have realized that organizations may be better served if employee training pertaining to security also 
focuses on habits. For that reason the experiment will include at least two groups. The first group will 
include individuals who have been trained through traditional means. The second group will consist of 
people who have gone through habit training. We are going to carry out pre and post tests that last one 
month each in which employees will randomly be asked to complete tasks that may result in unsafe 
behavior. 
Conclusion 
InfoSec is an extremely diverse topic. It encompasses managerial and technical controls to protect assets 
from all sorts of threats, while also managing risks associated with information usage. However, there is 
an aspect of InfoSec that is often overlooked, which is ascertaining the difference between conscious and 
unconscious errors in security breaches. In 2010, an estimated $6 billion cost was incurred from stolen 
laptops, many of them thoughtlessly left in cars, coffee shops, or unlocked offices (Perolroth, 2011). This 
number does not represent the financial impact of reputation loss.  
                                                             
3 Kandel, Eric In Search of Memory, pg. 199. W.W. Norton  Company NY, NY. 
4 Bedford, F.L. Of Computer Mice and Men. Current Psychology of Cognition, 13, 405-426. 
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A modern day business, especially a large one, puts employees in an environment where they form habits 
that unintentionally lend themselves to InfoSec breaches. It is this portion of InfoSec research that needs 
to be further explored, understood, and designed for if the discipline is to address its most basic function.  
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